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Is it possible to understand the intentions of other individuals 
by observing their actions? And how does unconsciously 
mimicking the behavior of other people relate to this? Mimicry 
is an important element of social cognition. Its settings and 
effects have been well studied. However, the neurobiological 
mechanism behind it remains uncertain. This review illuminates 
two neuroscientific approaches to explain the mechanism 
behind mimicry. On the one hand, simulation through the 
mirror neuron system (MNS) describes mimicry as a by-
product of simulation by certain motor-neurons. On the other 
hand, forward and inverse models, an internal prediction about 
future events, are an important concept in motor control theory 
and have been suggested to be involved in social cognition as 
well. The author proposes a model in which mimicry relates to 
forward and inverse models by acting as a facilitator of social 
cognition. A better prediction, due to mimicry, leads to a better 
understanding of others. Furthermore, limitations of the given 
approaches are illuminated. 
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iNtroduCtioN
One of the main aspects of being human is being a social individual. In the broadest 
definition, social cognition is what we think about ourselves and other people and 
how the processes involved influence our behavior and judgment in social contexts 
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(Hewstone, Stroebe, & Jonas, 2012). Social cognition as a research field has important 
sub-elements: for example the interest revolving around the Theory of Mind 
(ToM), the understanding and acknowledging of beliefs. Another element of social 
cognition and of importance to this review are social interactions. Interpersonal 
communication – the coordination between two interacting individuals – is one 
of the key features of social interaction. A complete picture of social cognition is 
far too complex for this review and therefore themes such ToM for an example are 
outside the focus of attention of this review. Interpersonal communication is about 
communicating information, meaning and feelings through verbal and non-verbal 
messages (i.e. gestures) and on the other hand, understanding intentions and 
messages from the other person. Accordingly the main focus of this review is on 
social interactions and mimicry.
 Mimicry is an important element of interpersonal communication which 
can occur at non-verbal and subconscious levels. Mimicry reflects the similarity 
of behaviors during a social interaction. An example is the image of two women 
sitting in a café talking to each other and unconsciously sharing the same body 
postures while they talk. Both have the same leg crossed over the other and seem 
to be driven by the same idea when crossing their legs over again. This realistic 
example illuminates how omnipresent mimicry is. However, it still tends to go 
unnoticed most of the time. Particularly of interest is the finding that mimicry in 
social contexts leads to an increase in liking and vice versa (Chartrand & bargh, 
1999). It shows an important consequence of this ubiquitous but often unnoticed 
behavior. The effects of interpersonal coordination have been the topic of interest 
in a large amount of research. However, the larger role of mimicry when it comes to 
social cognition and understanding others’ actions still needs further investigation. 
Therefore the focus of this review is to illuminate the mechanism behind mimicry 
by reviewing two approaches. On the one hand is the mirror system and on the 
other hand applications from predictive coding framework, namely forward and 
inverse models. before reviewing these, a more thorough overview is given about 
what mimicry entails.
 In general mimicry can be defined as “unintentionally doing what others are 
doing”, and research has shown that it’s often part of social encounters and occurs 
automatically (Hove & risen, 2009). Mimicry was empirically observed for the 
first time in the 1970’s in a study by LaFrance and broadbent (1976). They observed 
students in a classroom and noted that automatic copying of laughter, movement, 
body posture and behavior is adopted several seconds after the observed original 
behavior, concluding that body postures function as non-verbal indicators of 
relations. 
 Furthermore, research during this time revealed a correlation between mimicry 
and liking (Lakin & Chartrand, 2003). Chartrand and bargh (1999) demonstrated in 
a study that mimicry enhances rapport and liking. Within this study, a confederate 
mimicked the participants in one condition and strictly avoided mimicking them 
in the control condition.  Mimicked participants reported liking the confederate 
significantly more than those participants not being mimicked. Experiments such 
as this study highlight the effects of mimicry on social coordination. In addition, 
recent research revealed that the relationship between mimicry and liking is bi-
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directional; two persons who mimic the behavior of one another on a non-conscious 
level promote liking towards one another and vice versa. In other words, affiliations 
can be expressed through non-conscious mimicry (Lakin, Jefferis, Cheng, & 
Chartrand, 2003). However, mimicry can also have negative effects on affiliation 
(bailenson, Yee, Patel, & beall, 2008). Using computer agents that mimicked head 
movements of individuals confronted with them showed that explicit detection of 
mimicked movements had negative effects on affiliation.
 Patients suffering from autism spectrum disorder experience many problems 
related to social cognition. A better understanding of the mechanisms behind 
social cognition is necessary to address and eventually alleviate these problems. The 
occurrence and effects of mimicry have been investigated thoroughly and a lot is 
known about the behavioral consequences. Nonetheless, looking at mimicry leads 
to asking why the human brain is sensitive towards the observation of other people’s 
behavior. Answering this adds to the knowledge on social cognition. Therefore, 
this review has the objective to introduce two approaches explaining a mechanism 
behind mimicry. 
 The first approach concerns a topic that has received a lot of interest, with 
many supporters and as many people who disagree with the suggested concepts. 
Mirror neurons have received a considerable amount of attention since their 
discovery by Gallese and colleagues at the University of Parma. Since then many 
promising but also speculating hypotheses have been formed involving the mirror 
neuron system. While some researchers deny their importance in understanding 
other people (e.g. Hickok (2009)) other researchers strongly support the idea that 
mirror neurons enable humans to understand the meaning of other’s actions (e.g. 
Gallese & Goldman (1998), rizzolatti, Fogassi, & Gallese (2001)).  Many researchers 
have investigated the mirror neuron system and argue that they function as the 
neural basis of human perception and action coupling and in a wider sense the 
understanding of actions and intentions of other people (Gallese, Keysers, & 
rizzolatti, 2004). Therefore, it seems plausible to delineate how the MNS possibly 
relates to mimicry and to illuminate limitations of this approach. 
 Forward and inverse models have been shown to predict self-produced 
movement in the field of motor control. These prediction models often are also 
referred to as the predictive brain approach, the bayesian brain or the predictive 
coding framework. They are gaining an increasing significance, reaching as far as 
describing predictive coding as the general principle of how the brain works. It is 
interesting to reflect mimicry from this perspective. The predictive coding framework 
basically states that large parts of information processing, namely perception, 
understanding and action (a great deal of what is happening in the brain) can be 
modeled and explained by predictions. Complex cognitive processes such as social 
cognition have been included in this framework (brown & brüne, 2012) and in this 
review the possible relation to mimicry is considered. both approaches, the MNS 
and the predictive coding framework, are influential and a large amount of interest 
has been devoted to them. This leads to the question whether these two concepts 
from the field of neuroscience are able to explain mimicry, and which limitations 




Social cognition through the Mirror Neuron System
Gallese and Goldman (1998) introduced mirror neurons; a system of neurons 
partially located in the motor cortex. These mirror neurons fire when executing 
a movement but also when the person observes the very same movement. Gallese 
(2006) stated that “the hard problem in ‘social cognition’ is to understand how the 
epistemic gulf separating single individuals can be overcome” (p.2).  The influential 
findings on the Mirror Neuron System (MNS) guided research strongly towards a 
future in which this problem will eventually be solved.
 research on macaque monkeys showed that mirror neurons are located in the 
ventral premotor areas in the cortex. They do not only respond to goal directed 
movements made by the monkey himself, but also when he solely observed or heard 
a performance of a similar action. This similar action could be observing how a nut 
is being picked up or hearing how this nut is being cracked (Gallese & Goldman, 
1998). According to this idea, the monkey knew what the observed person was doing 
by using his own motor system (motor areas in the brain) as an internal simulator. 
Comparable findings have been also been made in humans (Fadiga, Fogassi, Pavesi, 
& rizzolatti, 1995).
 It has been suggested that the MNS could be the bridge between individuals, 
a neural mechanism that creates a social link (Gallese & Goldman, 1998). The 
activation of these cells creates the intuitive understanding of another person’s 
actions that human take for granted when observing someone else. They are, 
according to Gallese, Keysers and rizzolatti (2004), the neurophysiological basis of 
social cognition. 
 The “double-function” of mirror neurons refers to the ability of these neurons 
to fire when own movements are initiated, but also to fire when comparable 
movements are observed. This double- function enables to link 3rd-person 
experiences to 1st-person experienced events by simulating the neural event. This 
has been referred to as simulation by Gallese and Goldman (1998). This mechanism 
not only allows to see or hear what other members of one’s species are doing, but 
enables an understanding in the observer as if he was experiencing the action 
himself. However, as discussed in depth in the limitation section a major weakness 
of this approach is that no empirical evidence has been found supporting how the 
mirror neuron system could accomplish action understanding.
 Furthermore, the mirror neuron mechanism has been proposed to mediate 
the understanding of others’ emotions. A study focused on patients suffering from 
epilepsy with an implanted electrode located in the insula. The insula is an area 
in the brain involved in the perception and experience of emotions, amongst one 
of them being disgust. Findings suggest that the anterior insula is active when 
perceiving disgusting odorants as well as when the person is observing the facial 
expressions of disgusted people (Krolak-Salmon, et al., 2003). 
 relating back to mimicry the question arises how the MNS could relate to it 
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and what it contributes to the findings of increased social liking during mimicry. 
Gallese and Goldman (1998) showed that internally activated mirror neurons cause 
the execution of a planned movement. So to say, mirror neurons function as typical 
motor neurons. However, the very same mirror neurons when externally activated 
(i.e. when observing someone) show comparable activity but do not lead to an 
execution of the movement. They seem to be inhibited with regard to the usual self-
initiated movement or as Gallese and Goldman call it “taken off-line”.  This seems 
counterintuitive, as there is neural activity in motor areas but no movement follows 
as a consequence. Gallese and Goldman (1998) concluded, that the MNS functions 
as a simulation mechanism to put the observer “into the same ‘mental shoes’ as the 
target”. 
 A study by Fadiga et al. (1995) exploited transcranial magnetic stimulation 
(TMS) to stimulate the motor cortex of a subject. TMS is an established technique, 
which uses a strong magnetic field to stimulate certain areas of the brain. In this 
study the subject was observing hand movements grasping an object, while motor 
evoked potentials (MEP’s) were being recorded from his hands. The researchers 
were able to demonstrate that this led to significantly higher MEP’s in the same hand 
muscles, as the ones being observed. This condition was compared to conditions 
where the subject was only looking at the object or tracing the confederate’s finger 
drawing geometrical figures in the air. This is further evidence supporting the idea 
of a human system that matches observing an action and the execution of the same 
action on a neural level. Comparable results were made with MEP’s recorded from 
the tongue (Fadiga, Craighero, G.buccino, & G.rizzolatti, 2002). 
 The author suggests an explanation how mimicry could be the result of a 
mirror neuron system. Facilitated motor responses through the MNS then act as 
the basis of mimicry. Mimicry is essentially the unknown copying of an observed 
behavior, which comes into existence, as the necessary muscle groups used are 
facilitated, as explained in Fadiga’s (1995) TMS study on MEP’s. Motor responses are 
facilitated through the activity of mirror neurons in motor areas corresponding to 
the observed movement. Mimicry then appears to be a by-product of the simulation 
mechanism of mirror neurons. According to Gallese (1998) the purpose of mirror 
neurons is to serve as a simulator leading to action understanding of others. This 
is then accompanied by mimicry, which is essentially synchronized behavior (for 
clarification purposes the author created Figure 1). The given explanation entails that 
research investigating mimicry, was looking at observable instances of a simulation 
mechanism (the MNS). Simulation through mirror neurons is a form of neural 
synchrony between the observing person and the person performing an action and 
being observed. Self-other overlap refers to an understanding of another’s intention 
such as putting oneself “into the same ‘mental shoes’ as the target” (Gallese & 
Goldman, 1998).  Neural synchrony, by means of mirror neuron activity, thus leads 
to action understanding (a self-other overlap) and it leads to mimicry.
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Figure 1. Simulati on leads to an understanding of the other (self-other overlap) and to mimicry through 
facilitated motor responses
 Wheatley, Kang, Parkinson and Looser (2012) state that the MNS evolved to 
function as a bridge between two individuals thus promoting social understanding. 
First they conclude that neural synchrony (MNS) is an effi  cient process, which is 
supported through its ubiquity of forms within the brain and the fact that simulation 
through mirror neurons leads to a self-other overlap reducing processing capacities. 
Effi  ciency of any kind in the long term sustains throughout evolution and is often 
naturally rewarded. Their second argument is based on similarity functioning 
as a cue of kinship. The broad concept behind kinship is that there is a kinship 
mechanism that favors social behavior towards relatives, due to evolutionary 
relevance, which leads people to be more comfortable with similar people. When 
mimicking behavior, the similarity in it, even if not perfect, functions as an implicit 
cue of kinship and this might lead to liking.  In other words, shared movements 
suggest shared genes. 
 Finally, leading back to the introduction of this paper is the approach of 
looking at mimicry from the MNS viewpoint. Mimicry can be explained through the 
concept of the MNS. Within this approach mimicry is seen as a by-product of neural 
synchronization/simulation through the mirror neurons. These motor neurons fi re 
when observing someone but no motor execution occurs due to inhibition of this 
neural command to move. Mimicry to observed actions occurs quite often. However, 
the link between MNS and an increased social liking through mimicry needs a 
stronger argumentation than currently suggested by the author. Wheatley et al. 
(2012) note that the critical point is, that neural synchrony (MNS activity) appears 
to ensure effi  cient processing by means of a rewards signal, which explains fi ndings 
by e.g. Chartrand and bargh (1999) on the link between mimicry and liking. 
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Limitations of the MNS approach 
Mirror neurons are an important neurobiological discovery and have a strong 
intuitive appeal as to their importance for understanding social cognition. The MNS 
is often described with general explanations and functions which make it easy to 
understand and appeal as an explanation for many phenomena. However, empirical 
evidence for a concrete mechanism is lacking. Gallese (2006) stated that: […] “We 
do not have a clear neuroscientific model of how humans can understand the 
intentions promoting actions of others they observe”. And still eight years later the 
same question remains: if the MNS is in fact in charge of mediating understanding 
of actions and social coordination, how could it accomplish this? 
 building onto this criticism are questions about the interpretation of fMrI 
data used to infer MNS activity. Gallese’s and Goldman’s (1998) initial study focused 
on single-cell recordings that specifically show the activity of certain neurons in the 
monkey cortex. However, how can we be sure that the activity measured in one voxel 
(which is by far not equivalent to one neuron) originates from the same neurons 
when observing action and when executing the very same, they could merely be 
neighboring cells. 
 research has contributed a lot to specify where the exact parts of the MNS 
are located within the monkey brain and also partially within the human brain 
(Miall, 2003). However, this knowledge has often been oversimplified by the media 
and applied to many aspects of social cognition. Mirror neurons were claimed to 
create empathy when watching movies, leading to experience the same emotional 
moments seen on screen (dailymail.co.uk, 2013). Furthermore, in relation to the 
recent soccer world cup it has also been claimed that mirror neuron activity reflects 
higher understanding of the game. More experienced soccer players have higher 
activity of the MNS when watching a game (focus.de, 2014). However, there is no 
research that confirms the exact function of mirror neurons. 
 research has shown that these cells are part of a complex interacting network 
of neurons. Also the category of what qualifies as mirror neurons is very large, 
comprising cells that fire when observing an action, hearing an action or seeing 
biological motion. Of these cells many fire only under very specific circumstances 
and others fire to a broad range of movements. (Gallese & Goldman, 1998).  
research is still at the beginning and the limitations stated earlier should be kept 
in mind. Generalizing from areas of the monkey brain to areas of the human brain 
should be done with caution and also using human brain imaging data has its 
disadvantages, as it cannot depict single neuron activity. Single cell recordings give 
more detailed insight into the functioning of the MNS. However, it is invasive and 
seldom done in humans; only if medically necessary. 
 A different proposal for a mechanism behind social coordination and 
eventually the understanding of others’ intentions is the predictive approach of the 
brain, stating that the brain is able to predict events close in time. This mechanism 
has been suggested in the framework of the sensorimotor system and recent 
approaches focus on applying this concept onto social cognition. The following 
section illuminates on this. 
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Social coordination through internal models of forward and inverse planning
Forward and inverse models are established concepts within the Central Nervous 
System (CNS) to explain motor control in an individual. These models make use 
of a prediction of what a sensory event will be (Wolpert & Flanagan, 2001). The 
following section outlines forward and inverse models and their function in motor 
control. Furthermore, a link to mimicry is established by explaining social cognition 
through forward and inverse models.
Forward models of motor control
research established a general acceptance of the concept of forward models in 
motor control and these forward models predict the sensory consequences of our 
executed movements (Wolpert & Miall, 1996). Forward models of the motor system 
use a neural copy of a motor command. This neural copy is referred to as corollary 
discharge and is used to establish a prediction of the position of the body. This 
prediction is then compared to the actual position of the body after executing the 
movement. 
 Using tickling as an example illuminates how this mechanism works and 
explains why you cannot tickle yourself. An internal forward model supports 
attenuation of self-produced movements by using sensory predictions of the motor 
system (blakemore, Wolpert, & Frith, 2000). Accordingly, there will be actual 
sensory feedback from your hand; for example proprioceptive information, which 
is information about the relative position of your hand in space. Furthermore, 
there will also be the predicted sensory feedback from the forward model, which 
is established through the corollary discharge and called the efference copy. The 
discrepancy measured by your forward model between the predicted and actual 
feedback is what establishes the “tickliness” of someone. If there is no sensory 
discrepancy between your executed movement and the predicted movement then a 
sensory attenuation occurs and the sensation is not as tickling. This is what happens 
if a person tickles herself. However, if for example someone is being tickled, the 
efference copy of the self-created movement is missing. Accordingly this person 
cannot predict the movement and no sensory attenuation occurs, due to a high 
prediction error. In consequence being tickled is experienced as a lot more tickling in 
comparison to self-tickling. blakemore, Wolpert and Frith (2000) propose that this 
attenuation through the forward model has advantageous effects for an individual 
as sensory information is being filtered. Filtering of information, especially of 
external sensory information is a necessary element of many brain processes to 
avoid a cognitive overload and ensure efficient processing of the environment. This 
filtering is an important trade-off between sensing everything and recognizing 
what is important to an individual in terms of survival. Sensory feedback created by 
external events can be more easily discovered and self-produced movements, which 
are filtered, can be weakened (blakemore, Wolpert, & Frith, 2000). 
Inverse models of motor control
Inverse models are, as the name suggests, an inverse model of forward models. 
Inverse models form the relationship between intended goals or actions, and the 
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motor commands to achieve those goals. So basically, inverse models use a given 
input to estimate an appropriate command. As an example, if you are hungry and 
intend to pick up a slice of apple, your internal inverse model transforms the visual 
input (sensory representation of relative positions of the apple and your arm) into 
motor commands. The flow of information along pathways in the brain would be 
from occipital visual areas to areas in the posterior-parietal cortex (PPC) and would 
then feed through pre-motor and motor cortex to execute the command (Miall, 
2003). 
 It has been shown that forward and inverse models act together within the 
motor system to establish a functional motor control. This is achieved through 
the architecture of motor control that incorporates multiple pairs of forward and 
inverse models (Harumo, Wolpert, & Kawato, 2001). Functional motor control is 
achieved through a dynamic repetition of an inverse model giving a first command 
to move and a forward model calculating the error between the prediction of the 
movement and the actual position. This error is then fed back to the inverse model, 
which reacts with an upgrade command (Churchland, 2002). It follows that the 
combination of forward and inverse models presents a mechanism that is fast and 
reliable, an essential aspect of motor control. Constant monitoring through them 
allows correcting or reacting to unexpected events, such as lifting an object that is 
lighter than expected and motor responses occurring appropriately. And taking this 
concept one step further, assuming that forward and inverse models are capable 
of learning this combination of models would create a very efficient system able to 
acquire a broad range of sensorimotor skills and could be a fundamental mechanism 
for different cognitive functions (Churchland, 2002). 
Social cognition through forward and inverse models
Forward and inverse models are not exclusively applicable to motor control. 
Forward and inverse models are a fundamental computational mechanism for 
sensorimotor prediction. This has been well researched and an increasing amount 
of attention and work is devoted to investigate how a predictive coding framework 
can include complex cognitive processes such as social cognition (brown & brüne, 
2012). research revealed a link between internal models of motor control and 
the understanding of one’s own intentions (blakemore, Wolpert, & Frith, 2000). 
The following section elaborates on this finding and illuminates how forward and 
inverse models function in relation to social cognition. 
 research comparing schizophrenic patients with healthy subjects revealed 
important implications for the functioning of forward models. The efference 
copy of a movement is likely to have a more important role with regard to sensory 
attenuation than the re-afferent information from the body part being moved. A 
defect in the “self-monitoring” mechanism of the forward model that creates the 
sensory prediction of movements (the efference copy) causes schizophrenic patients 
to experience a passivity of their movements. This means they cannot distinguish 
between movements made by themselves or others through the sensory prediction 
that would attenuate the sensation. Healthy control subjects were compared to 
schizophrenic patients with symptoms of passivity. The subjects judged whether 
they tickled themselves or whether they were externally tickled. There was a clear 
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difference in tickliness between healthy subjects and schizophrenic subjects. 
Healthy subjects reported a difference in tickliness when tickling themselves or being 
tickled. However, schizophrenic subjects did not report this difference (blakemore, 
Wolpert, & Frith, 2000). This reveals the possible importance of internal forward 
and inverse models in relation to social cognition. Understanding how humans can 
become aware of their own intended actions is the first step in comprehending how 
humans are capable of understanding others.
 The author suggests a hypothetical predictive account initially suggested by 
Wolpert, Doya and Kawato (2003). Observing another person (here person 2) could 
function as visual input for an inverse model. The input replaces for example the 
relative position of one’s hand and an object. Following this, an inverse model would 
generate communicative signals by initiating certain motor commands towards 
person 2 (e.g. speech gestures). A forward model of the individual would predict 
the sensory consequences of the motor command, in this case speech commands. 
Person 2 reacts to this by giving a motor command again, which closes the social 
interaction loop. His command provides feedback to the forward model of the first 
person; a prediction error is fed back to the inverse model which provides a new 
command through these consequences. As described earlier, a discrepancy between 
the prediction of another person’s behavior and the actual observed behavior can 
be used to refine the inverse model (Wolpert, Doya, & Kawato, 2003). Furthermore, 
through an inverse model a person becomes aware of his intention why he wanted 
to move (e.g. pick up slice of apple). With feedback from the person being observed 
an estimate of what one’s intention would have been for the same action can be 
inferred. This intention is then attributed to the person being observed (blakemore 
& Decety, 2001). This social interaction loop functions by continuously predicting 
the other person. The following section illuminates how this social interaction loop 
based on forward and inverse models relates back to mimicry. 
 The human brain is all about efficiency. Communication between areas of the 
brain is created through synchronous firing of neurons in these areas. Also sensory 
input from the environment is processed in separate areas in the brain e.g. color 
and shape of objects are processed in different visual areas. These features of objects 
are combined again through synchronous firing (Engel & Singer, 2001). Neural 
synchrony in the brain is therefore an efficient process and the brain shows certain 
sensitivity to synchrony. This is also the case with mimicry. Mimicry of behavior 
promotes liking, on the other hand liking someone promotes this unconscious 
mimicry (Lakin & Chartrand, 2003). The author proposes that mimicry acts as a 
facilitator of social cognition. It is the result of interacting forward and inverse 
models of two or more persons respectively. Being in synchrony on a behavioral 
level (mimicry) promotes a synchrony on a neural level. This neural level refers to 
the prediction made by the forward models of two or more interacting persons. 
Understanding of others’ intentions is promoted through a small prediction error 
of their forward models. Mimicry facilitates communication between two people 
by giving the forward models an “easy opportunity” to predict actions of the other 
person. This leads to a small prediction error. A small prediction error in our earlier 
example of tickling led to a sensory attenuation. However, in the social context 
instead of a sensory attenuation, a natural reward, namely liking towards the person 
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is established. A more effective form of communication is established, and better 
understanding of the person one is interacting with has advantageous effects in 
evolutionary terms. but also the opposite relationship, in how far liking a person leads 
to an increase of mimicry, deserves attention. Interacting with a person means the 
brain is constantly predicting her actions. When liking a person the prediction error 
made by one’s forward models is either small right away and promotes a facilitation 
of motor responses, which would reveal itself in mimicry. On the other hand the 
prediction error might be less accurate in beginning and then decrease over time as 
people become more similar behaviorally over time as well.  Mimicry in this sense 
would then ensure mutual liking, while liking a person from the beginning on does 
not have an evolutionary advantage (this is not necessarily mutually), a mechanism 
that would promote mutual liking does have an evolutionary advantage. Mimicry in 
this sense would then function as a facilitator of social cognition.
Limitations of the predictive coding framework
Andy Clark (2013) concluded that predictive processing models offer the best 
clue until now for a unified science of mind and action. They promise to unite 
cognition, perception, action and attention within one framework. This framework 
suggests a hierarchical, bi-directional processing including top-down and bottom-
up connections, where prediction- error minimization functions as the driving 
mechanism behind many cognitive functions (Clark, 2013). 
 However, a comprehensive understanding of the physical (i.e. neural) 
implementation of predictive coding frameworks remains yet to be shown (Egner 
& Summerfield, 2013). After all what has been illuminated on forward and inverse 
models within this review came from a computational point of view. According to 
Marr’s (1982) different levels of information-processing, the computational level in 
itself has to be distinguished from the physical level, thus the implementation of 
the theory. 
 A disagreement exists on how this predictive mechanism is implemented. 
Additionally, it remains to be shown how the predictive and error messages are 
coded and transmitted via forward and backward connections in a hierarchy (Clark, 
2013). Various implementations of the predictive coding theory have been suggested 
involving different cortical areas and circuits.
 Nevertheless, the current lack of a general empirical demonstration of the 
predictive coding does not restrict its importance on generating theories involving 
prediction as a likely mechanism of brain functioning.  Studies on the neural 
implementations of predictive coding have been scarce. 
diSCuSSioN
Summing up the main points, mirror neurons are motor neurons not only firing in 
response to goal-directed movements but also when the individual is observing or 
hearing the performance of a similar action. In this sense, mirror neurons are motor 
neurons used as an internal simulator to understand what another individual is doing 
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(Gallese & Goldman, 1998). Mimicry is a by-product of this simulation mechanism, 
which has been shown in higher MEP’s recorded from muscles involved in a certain 
observed action (Fadiga, Fogassi, Pavesi, & rizzolatti, 1995). by highlighting how 
mimicry promotes neural synchrony it is emphasized that the opposite direction of 
this relationship is important as well. However, the MNS approach has often been 
oversimplified and put in a context in which this approach is used to explain a lot 
more than what has empirically been shown. 
 Forward models of motor control rely on a copy of a motor command, 
established by an inverse model, to calculate an error based on the prediction and 
the actual feedback from the motor command. A small prediction error leads to 
sensory attenuation which has evolutionary advantages due to an increased ability 
to differentiate between self-produced movements and external events. Using the 
motor system within this review to explain the functioning of forward and inverse 
models should not overemphasize the relation between forward models and the 
motor system. After all, a forward model is just a prediction. Seeing it like this, 
the brain often predicts events without necessarily involving the motor system. 
Visual perception and automatic processes of the brain, filling in the blind spot for 
example, are then also a prediction and a kind of forward model. 
 This functional combination of forward and inverse models has also been 
applied to social cognition (Wolpert, Doya, & Kawato, 2003). A social interaction 
loop is established, an interaction between individuals instead of forward and 
inverse models functioning within one individual. This social interaction loop 
creates mutual understanding based on predictions by the forward models of each 
person. Mimicry relates to this by functioning as a facilitator of social cognition. 
When mimicry is present, a small prediction error is made when predicting motor 
commands of the other person, which leads to efficient communication, having 
evolutionary advantages.
 Leading back to the beginning of this review, the behavioral consequences of 
mimicry have been explained to a certain extent. However, what is the underlying 
mechanism and can neuroscience explain it? both approaches have their strengths 
and weaknesses. 
 The MNS approach relates to mimicry by seeing it as a by-product of simulation. 
This concept is supported by findings from TMS studies (Fadiga, Fogassi, Pavesi, 
& rizzolatti, 1995). The simulation mechanism creates understanding of another 
person; this leads to liking this person on the one hand and mimicry as a by-product 
on the other hand. This approach is a reasonable explanation given the current 
knowledge on the MNS. Nevertheless, the reverse relationship, namely mimicry 
leading to enhanced liking deserves deeper attention from the MNS viewpoint. 
 Forward and inverse models of motor control are a well-established concept 
and based empirical findings. Forward and inverse models have been suggested as 
a mechanism to explain social cognition (e.g. Wolpert, Doya, & Kawato (2003)). 
However, linking these theories and findings to mimicry has so far not been 
approached. The author proposed in this review a possible mechanism, explaining 
why mimicry leads to enhanced mutual liking, based on forward and inverse 
models. Mimicry within this approach functions as a facilitator of social cognition, 
by leading to a small prediction error of the forward model. I think a lot can be 
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gained when elaborating on this concept in future research. Its usefulness and 
application has been empirically shown with relation to motor control in humans 
and future research should aim to apply and proof this model in relation to areas of 
cognition, however with caution to avoid oversimplification. 
 When it comes to mirror neurons there has yet to be research, revealing the full 
functional significance of these cells. Mirror neuron research is still in its infancy 
and many different approaches using this concept have been elaborated. Forward 
and inverse models, however, have been an empirically solid proven concept 
in motor control and are presented as a less speculative concept than the MNS. 
Findings in relation to the MNS approach have been too vague until now to allow it 
being a solid independent concept. Especially the hype around mirror neurons in 
explaining social cognition and causes of autism should be evaluated carefully. 
 Forward and inverse models on the other hand, are also not the final answer. 
The concept of internal models can offer a lot to possible mechanisms behind social 
cognition. But again one could run the risk to oversimplify the topic and apply this 
approach too easily onto other areas besides motor control. After all, forward models 
are simply a prediction made by the brain of an individual to estimate future events. 
So the question arises whether a mechanism behind social cognition must be in 
the form of a forward model, or whether social cognition has a completely different 
mechanism behind it. Finally, both approaches reviewed here have been under a lot 
of investigation, especially mirror neurons. However, at this point in time no clear 
answer can be given to which mechanism leads to social cognition. 
 This review summarized findings from the field of cognitive neuroscience and 
aims to encourage researchers to look at social cognition and especially mimicry 
from a different angle. Future research should investigate the predictive account of 
the motor system in relation to social cognition to enlarge the existing concept and to 
illuminate the link between observed action, the motor system and social cognition 
(social understanding). Moreover, research focusing on the implementation level of 
predictive coding approaches is necessary.
 Furthermore, many questions remain unanswered with regard to the MNS. For 
example, it is still unclear why mirror neurons seem to be specific for movements 
towards objects and food; in case of the macaque monkeys (Fadiga, Fogassi, Pavesi, 
& rizzolatti, 1995). Also the exact definition of mirror neurons should be in the 
focus of research, since many different types of cells, in different functional and 
structural areas of the brain are now considered mirror neurons. It will most likely 
happen in the future that meaning and understanding of others will discovered 
to be not a single process or mechanism, but rather a combination of processes 
involving motor emulation, abstract cognition and other planning components of 
the cortex. And we are only beginning to understand their roles.
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